Possible assertion type "is equivalent to" (or maybe "does not exist")? #10
Comments
|
thanks - I guess I had envisioned using the synonym function to express
that two concepts were the same. but the idea of explicitly expressing
that a concept does not exist is interesting. it seems that this would need
to be a relation between a theory and a concept, right? e.g.
"asserts_nonexistence(theoryA,conceptX)". does that sound right?
…On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 10:58 AM, Taylor Salo ***@***.***> wrote:
I was thinking that it might be useful if contributors could assert that
two terms are the same, or that one term doesn't exist.
I have an example, although I'm not exactly an expert on memory. Currently
in the Cognitive Atlas, explicit memory
<https://cognitiveatlas.org/concept/id/trm_4a3fd79d0a281/> is considered
separate from, and a kind of, declarative memory
<https://cognitiveatlas.org/concept/id/trm_4a3fd79d0a04f/>. Most of the
literature I've read conflates the two, so, assuming the differentiation in
the Cognitive Atlas isn't an error, I think this reflects two competing
theories. In order to compare the two theories, we need to be able to
assert that the two terms are the same, as described by "theory A", since
having them separated and connected with the kind-of relationship is part
of "theory B".
—
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub
<#10>, or mute the thread
<https://github.com/notifications/unsubscribe-auth/AA1KkIG8yIGq8iWicMBEcZ-TvUdaIQu3ks5tHR9dgaJpZM4RTa-z>
.
--
Russell A. Poldrack
Albert Ray Lang Professor of Psychology
Professor (by courtesy) of Computer Science
Bldg. 420, Jordan Hall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
[email protected]
http://www.poldracklab.org/
|
|
If synonym assertions can be tied to a theory or reference, that would work perfectly. At least for me (and I might just not be doing things the best way), when I do text mining with the Cognitive Atlas, I extract each term and its synonyms and count them all toward the term. When there are duplicates (e.g., the synonym of one term is the same as the preferred name of another term), I use the term that is closest to the duplicate. So in the case of explicit memory and declarative memory, whichever theory it is that posits that the two concepts are distinct will win out, even if explicit memory is included as a synonym of declarative memory. If the synonym's existence is tied to some number of papers, though, I could just choose which term to count the string towards based on which one has more citations, or something. Of course, this is only important for text extraction and probably wouldn't affect people who are using the ontology as a reference; although, without some way of clarifying that the synonym assertion stands in contrast to the assertion that explicit memory is a kind of declarative memory, I can see those users being confused as well. Tying the nonexistence assertion between a theory and a concept makes a lot of sense of me. I hadn't considered including theories directly in assertions, but it's a cool idea. Alternatively, would it be possible to expose assertions and the terms themselves to users for voting? I think it would be useful to be able to characterize disagreement in the field, even if votes require references. E.g., instead of asserting that a conceptX doesn't exist (based on some paper), I could go to the concept and add in a reference for the paper against the concept. |
|
yes, great idea re: voting, though implementation of that may take a little
while.
…On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 11:30 AM, Taylor Salo ***@***.***> wrote:
If synonym assertions can be tied to a theory or reference, that would
work perfectly.
At least for me (and I might just not be doing things the best way), when
I do text mining with the Cognitive Atlas, I extract each term and its
synonyms and count them all toward the term. When there are duplicates
(e.g., the synonym of one term is the same as the preferred name of another
term), I use the term that is closest to the duplicate. So in the case of
explicit memory and declarative memory, whichever theory it is that posits
that the two concepts are distinct will win out, even if explicit memory is
included as a synonym of declarative memory. If the synonym's existence is
tied to some number of papers, though, I could just choose which term to
count the string towards based on which one has more citations, or
something.
Of course, this is only important for text extraction and probably
wouldn't affect people who are using the ontology as a reference; although,
without some way of clarifying that the synonym assertion stands in
contrast to the assertion that explicit memory is a kind of declarative
memory, I can see those users being confused as well.
Tying the nonexistence assertion between a theory and a concept makes a
lot of sense of me. I hadn't considered including theories directly in
assertions, but it's a cool idea.
Alternatively, would it be possible to expose assertions and the terms
themselves to users for voting? I think it would be useful to be able to
characterize disagreement in the field, even if votes require references.
E.g., instead of asserting that a conceptX doesn't exist (based on some
paper), I could go to the concept and add in a reference for the paper
*against* the concept.
—
You are receiving this because you commented.
Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub
<#10 (comment)>,
or mute the thread
<https://github.com/notifications/unsubscribe-auth/AA1KkMVAvfLJRFvb8DOiA_k44EN88JZeks5tHSbFgaJpZM4RTa-z>
.
--
Russell A. Poldrack
Albert Ray Lang Professor of Psychology
Professor (by courtesy) of Computer Science
Bldg. 420, Jordan Hall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
[email protected]
http://www.poldracklab.org/
|
I was thinking that it might be useful if contributors could assert that two terms are the same, or that one term doesn't exist.
I have an example, although I'm not exactly an expert on memory. Currently in the Cognitive Atlas, explicit memory is considered separate from, and a kind of, declarative memory. Most of the literature I've read conflates the two, so, assuming the differentiation in the Cognitive Atlas isn't an error, I think this reflects two competing theories. In order to compare the two theories, we need to be able to assert that the two terms are the same, as described by "theory A", since having them separated and connected with the kind-of relationship is part of "theory B".
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: